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Little more than a decade ago Soviet leaders and analysts were 
enthusiastically optimistic about the direction and pace of international 
developments and about Soviet prospects for the future They wrote and spoke 
incessantly of the "changing international correlation of forces," by which they 
meant the global shift in relative military, economic and political strength in 
favor of the Soviet Union, its allies and the "forces of peace and against the 
forces of Western imperialism 1 Developments of the prior decade, or so, tended 
to support this viewpoint
In the area of strategic nuclear capabilities the Soviet Union had closed 
the gap with the United States and achieved strategic parity Soviet strategic 
equality -  and by extension Soviet equality as a global power -  was recognized 
in a series of agreeements negotatiated at Vladivostok, Moscow and Helsinki 
Soviet conventional forces in both Europe and Asia, as well as their expanded 
ability to project military power beyond their immediate borders, had been 
enhanced by the modernization of Warsaw Pact forces, the creation of a "blue 
water" navy and long-distance air transport capability, and the extension and 
modernization of forces in Asia
The West's acceptance at Helsinki of the postwar status quo in Europe, the 
defeat of the United States in Vietnam, as well as the coming to power of 
self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist "national liberation" movements throughout the 
Third World, gave further evidence of the enhanced role of the Soviet Union in 
world affairs In the international economic realm the Soviets envisaged the 
establishment of a socialist international division of labor that would first 
counter and evenutally replace the dominant capitalist world market
Domestically economic growth rates, though they had slowed since the 
immediate postwar period, still enabled the Soviet leadership to fulfill its 
promises to meet growing domestic consumer demand and simultaneously to maintain 
the expanding military and economic commitments necessitated by the new role as 
a global power
2On the other hand, in the wake of the defeat in Vietnam and of the 
Watergate scandai, the U S leadership seemed incapable of responding to Soviet 
initiatives The détente relationship of the 1970s was, from the Soviet 
perspective, but tacit recognition on the part of the United States that it 
could no longer ignore Soviet interests and was forced by the new realities of 
world affairs to accept and recognize as legitimate the interests of the USSR 
and of those progressive forces and movements which it supported
Despite this Soviet optimism of the 1970s and the apparent reality that 
underlay it, by the beginning of the present decade the Soviets found themselves 
increasingly on the defensive The détente with the West (especially the 
United States) had collapsed into a new cold war complete with economic embargo, 
revitalized U S military spending, and a new U S assertiveness in foreign 
policy Despite Soviet blustering, West European NATO states had agreed to the 
the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and the Reagan 
Administration had committed itself to the development of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative In Asia Japan was expanding its military capabilities and 
reaffirming its security ties with the United States, while China had entered 
upon its four modernizations0 campaign that included a refurbishing of military 
capabilities and closer association with Japan and the West
In the Third World the USSR had been effectively frozen out of particiation 
in key developoments in the Middle East and several of its new al 11es/clients 
had failed to create stable poiitical-economic systems and were increasingly 
challenged by domestic insurgencies supported by the United States and others 
The result was a growing demand for Soviet military and economic support, 
including the direct takeover by Soviet troops of responsibility for the 
security of the Marxist-Leninist regime in Afghanistan Along with this came 
criticism of Soviet intervention by a wide range of developing countries 
themselves
In yet another area the Soviets found that the political attractiveness of
3their soc i o-economi c-pol 1 11 cal model had weakened markedly The unity of the 
Soviet-led World Communist Movement had long since shattered In Western Europe 
communist parties had either lost domestic support or asserted their 
independence -from Moscow —  or both Throughout the Third World a growing 
number o-f Marxist regimes were in the process o-f reexamining their commitment to 
socialism and reestablishing or strengthening economic and political ties with 
the West
These problems arose at the very time when the weaknesses o-f the Soviet 
economy were becoming most apparent By the beginning o-f the 1980s economic 
growth rates had, in the words o-f General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, "-fallen 
to a level close to economic stagnation '2 The techological gap between the 
Soviet economy and the economies o-f its major competitors, including a number o-f 
developing countries, was expanding 3 After decades devoted to "catching up" 
with the West in a wide range o-f -fields and establishing themselves as a global 
power, the Soviets -faced the prospect o-f stagnation and decline
Briefly, the situation inherited by Brezhnev's successors was one -filled 
with contradictions Although the Soviet Union had emerged as a global 
superpower with wide-ranging interests and capabilities, its position was based 
primarily on military power The nuclear stalement with the United States, the 
renewed activism of U S policy, and the expanding role of other countries in 
global affairs, however, precluded turning this enhanced mi 11 tary position into 
effective political gains Nowhere was this clearer than in Asia, where the 
growth of Soviet military power threatened to drive China into an alliance with 
the United States and the military relationship with Vietnam enhanced the 
security concerns of the ASEAN states The weaknesses of the Soviet economy 
raised questions about possible over-extension of Soviet international 
commitments and limited the relevance of the USSR for many of the most pressing 
of international problems —  economic development, trade, and debts 4
Since he assumed the leadership of the CPSU in spring 1985 Mikhail
4Gorbachev has spoken repeatedly of the domestic and foreign policy problems 
■facing the USSR He has committed himself to a major reform of the entire 
Soviet system as a means of resolving these problems The basic argument that 
he has presented to support this reform can be summarized briefly as follows 
First, the economic problems of the USSR and the technology gap between the 
Soviet Union and the West are expanding and bode ill for the ability of the USSR 
to ensure its military security and its global standing in the twenty-first 
century Second, economic reform, within the framework of socialism, 
perestroika, is essential in order to overcome the economic problems and 
technological weaknesses of the USSR that threaten to undermine its 
international status, required, as well, as a precondition for economic reform, 
is a reform of the political process which will make officials more responsive 
to the needs of economic rationality Third, to overcome entrenched 
bureaucratic forces within the Soviet Union which will resist change, a more 
open, but still controlled, political system that encourages criticism and 
rationality in support of reform is required —  "glasnost7" and 
demokratizatsiia " Finally, policies are needed which will enable the Soviets 
to benefit more fully from advances in the international economy and to 
accomplish, by means other than primarily military, major Soviet foreign policy 
objec 11 ves
In sum, one of the primary objectives of Gorbachev's campaign of 
perestroika and glasnost —  though by no means the sole one —  is based on 
his recognition that the position of the USSR in the world is dependent upon a 
dramatic improvement in the functioning of the Soviet economy In his report to 
the 27th Party Congress in early 1986 he expressed this point most forcefully 
In a word, comrades, acceleration of the country's economic development is the 
key to all our problems, immediate and long term, economic and social, political 
and ideological, domestic and foreign 5 "Perestroika" is his call for major 
reform with the goal of revitalizing the economy, closing the technology gap,
5and turning the USSR into a fully competitive global superpower —  not the 
incomplete superpower" of today that lacks virtually all but military power as 
an instrument to influence world developments 6
Moreover, as Gorbachev has also noted, a period of stability and calm in 
Soviet foreign policy is essential to the overall success of his reform 
policies Without a reduction in the tensions that have characterized 
U S -Soviet relations during much of the present decade, and those with China 
for almost thirty years, the Soviet leadership will be unable to devote either 
the attention or the resources required to implement domestic reform Thus, the 
domestic and foreign policies of the USSR are intertwined in two distinct, but 
overlapping ways Maintaining and improving the global role of the USSR is a 
prime determinant of the domestic politics of reform, while simultaneously a 
shift in foreign policy aimed at reducing tensions and, in particular, the 
economic and political costs of a renewed arms race and at expanding political 
and economic relationships with the outside world are a necessary condition for 
the successful implementation of reform
Gorbachevs "New Political Thinking" in Foreign Policy 
At the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986 Gorbachev opened his political 
report by asserting that problems had been building up more rapidly than "the 
inertness and fossi 1 ization of the forms and methods of administration could 
handle7 With these words he began an extended litany of problems in Soviet 
society and the call for the new thinking1 and openness that have come to 
characterize his tenure as leader of the Party Turning to the international 
arena, Gorbachev continued with the demand for rethinking the policies of the 
past
A turning point has been reached not only in internal but also in 
external affairs The changes in the present world are so deep and 
significant that they require a reappraisal and comprehensive 
analysis of all factors The situation created by the nuclear 
confrontation calls for new approaches, methods and forms of 
relations between the different social systems, states and regions °
éIn numerous public statements since the Party Congress Gorbachev and other 
Soviet leaders and analysts have argued that the agenda tor retorm in the 
Soviet Union encompasses not only domestic but toreign policy as well 
Obviously the essential question, trom the perspective ot the analyst, concerns 
the degree to which the réévaluation ot Soviet toreign policy is more than mere 
rhetorical updating ot Soviet policy and, thus, likely to influence actual 
Soviet behavior Although it is not possible to provide a conclusive answer to 
this question, a growing body ot evidence indicates that Gorbachev's call tor 
new thinking in the foreign and security policy area is more than mere
rhetoric meant -for propaganda purposes
In his report to the 27th Party Congress Gorbachev gave some indication of
the content of the new political thinking" when he raised issues seldom, if 
ever, discussed publicly by Soviet political leaders in the past The major 
points that he mentioned include 1) a recognition of the existence of “global 
problems, affecting all humanity" the resolution of which requires "cooperation 
on a worldwide scale close and constructive joint action by the majority
of countries", 2) explicit stress on the interdependence of states, 3) the 
argument that "it is no longer possible to win an arms race, or nuclear war for 
that matter and that the striving for military superiority can, objectively 
speaking, bring no political dividends to anybody", and 4) strong criticism of 
the infallibility complex" and the inertness and conservatism that 
characterized previous Soviet policy ?
In referring to global problems and the growing interdependence among 
states, Gorbachev introduced concepts that differ measurably from those that 
characterized the statements of his predecessors Most significant is the 
stress that he placed on interdependence and the need for international 
cooperation This is most evident in the security sphere where, he argue, the 
character of present-day weaponry leaves no country with any hope of 
safeguarding itself solely with military and technical means To ensure
7security is increasingly seen as a political problem, and it can only be 
resolved by political means “ The security of the Soviet Union and the United 
States can be maintained only if it is mutual, moreover, although the U S 
military-industrial complex is still the “locomotive of militarism," it is 
important to recognize that its interests are not identical with the actual 
national interests of that great country " Finally, the world is dynamic and 
“it is not within anybody s power to maintain a perpetual status quo in it It 
consists of scores of countries, each having its own perfectly legitimate 
interests “10
Since the Congress the call for "new thinking" has been a dominant theme 
in the Party press H  The most authoritative expansions on Gorbachev's 
description of the elements of the “new thinking" can be found in articles by 
Politburo Member Aleksandr Iakovlev, by Anatol 11 Dobrynin, the former secretary 
of the Central Committee who headed the International Department, by Evgenyi 
Primakov, successor to Iakovlev as Director of the Institute of World Economics 
and International Relations and by Vadim Medvedev, the new ideological chief of 
the Party 12
Gorbachev's views draw heavily on those of academic analysts who began 
discussing a number of years ago most of the issues that have now been placed 
on the agenda of the top political leadership For example, since the 
mid-1970s a number of academic writers as well as some party officials had 
developed the arguments concerning growing interdependence in the contemporary 
world, especially in the area of security, and the importance of "global 
problems the solution of which requires increased cooperation 13 in fact, 
class conflict, which has been the cornerstone of all Marxist social theory, 
seemingly takes a back seat to the need to preserve the human race 14
Also relevant to understanding the background of Gorbachev's new 
political thinking has been what William Odom has called the third 
revolution" in Soviet military affairs 15 This "revolution" has involved a
8major reassessment of the relevance of nuclear weapons in maintaining security 
or accomplishing policy objectives Chief among those who have pointed to the 
catastrophic consequences of nuclear war and, therefore, the need to overcome 
the inertia of thought and a stubborn, mechanical, unthinking attachment to 
the old ways“16 has been Marshal N V Ogarkov, former Chief of the Soviet 
General Staff Ogarkov and others have presented this argument in order to 
buttress their call for the resources needed to take advantage of recent 
technological developments to modernize the conventional military capabilities 
of the USSR However, their depiction of the limited military and political 
utility of nuclear weapons is directly relevant to aspects of the new 
political thinking advocated by Gorbachev, who has argued that an arms race 
cannot be 'won and will likely increase mutual threats to the point that 
nuclear parity will no longer guarantee deterrence
New thinking also characterizes Soviet assessments of policy in the 
Third World While the 1961 Party Program had spoken with great optimism about 
prospects for liberation and the role of the USSR in supporting the liberation 
struggle, the new program emphasizes the revitalized role of neo-col on i alism 
and imperialism in the Third World and notes only that the "CPSU supports the 
just struggle waged by the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America against 
imperialism and that the Soviet Union is on the side of the states
and peoples repulsing the attacks of the aggressive forces of imperialism and 
upholding their freedom, independence and national dignity Progressive 
states are informed that the tasks of building a new society are primarily 
their own responsibility, although the "Soviet Union has been doing and will 
continue to do all it can to render the peoples following that 
[socialist-oriented] road assistance in economic and cultural development, in 
training national personnel, in strengthening their defences and in other 
fields 17
The three major concerns that appear in Soviet writing and statements on
9current developments in the Third World relate to the escalting costs borne by 
the Soviet Union in supporting its clients, the poor record of these clients 
after independence in creating stable political systems and -functioning 
economies, and the negative impact that involvement in the Third World has had 
on other Soviet -foreign polcy concerns —  in particular relations with the 
United States 18
This brie-f review o-f recent Soviet interpretations o-f the “new political 
thinking“ in -foreign policy demonstrates that the political leadership in 
Moscow, at least General Secretary and his key supporters, is committed to a 
new approach to -foreign policy This new approach is based on a more complex 
view o-f the international system and appears to take into account the -fact that 
in the contemporary world no country, including the USSR, is able to impose its 
view o-f world order on the international system At least at the rhetorical 
level the Soviet leadership appears to understand the realities o-f the 
international system in which it is operating
By no means does this mean that Gorbachev -faces no opposition nor that his 
views on -foreign policy —  or domestic policy, -for that matter will 
necessarily win out in the long run However, assuming Gorbachev's basic 
success in implementing his own policy pre-ferences, the crucial question that 
remains to be answered concerns the impact that his “new thinking has had, or 
is likely to have, on actual Soviet -foreign policy behavior
Implementation o-f the “New Political Thinking“
For Gorbachev and other key -foreign policy decision makers and advisors in 
Moscow the shift in foreign policy has been necessitated by the demands of the 
domestic economic and political reform that is essential to the long-term 
viability of the USSR as a global power, as well as by the mixed record of 
success and failure in Soviet foreign policy In his attempts to implement 
this new approach to foreign policy Gorbachev has reorganized the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Central Committee International
10
Department, and the -foreign trade sector, the International Information 
Department o-f the Central Committee has been disbanded and its international 
propaganda activies brought under the control of Politburo member Iakovlev By 
June 1987 well over half of all Soviet ambassadors had been replaced (74 of 
120), and only one deputy minister of foreign affairs remained from the 
Brezhnev era The foreign minister, his two first deputy ministers and seven 
deputy ministers have been replaced by Gorbachev 19 Moreover, a new 
directorate was created within the Ministry to centralize oversight of all arms 
control and disarmament considerations Personnel changes in the Central 
Committee s International Department also facilitate the introduction of new 
thinking into the foreign policy process The seasoned diplomat Anatol ii 
Dobrynin, a major advocate of restructuring, took over as head of the 
International Department and reoriented its outlook and activities Six of the 
nine deputy chiefs of the Department have been appointed under Gorbachev 20 of 
the other three Karen Brutents is among those whose reassessment of Soviet 
policy in the Third World fits closely with Gorbachev's views Moreover, a new 
section for arms control has been established within the Department Finally, 
Aleksandr Iakovlev, a close associate of Gorbachev and one of the most forceful 
proponents of the new thinking, has been elevated to full membership in the 
Politburo and given top authority in the foreign policy area in fall 1988 when 
he replaced Dobrynin 21
Although these and other administrative and personnel changes introduced 
during since 1985 do not guarantee changes in actual Soviet policy, they 
represent a first step toward streamlining the policy-making process and, thus, 
facilitating a more flexible approach to policy making
Opposition to Gorbachev' stated policy objectives in the international 
arena has been muted and is not nearly so evident as that concerning domestic 
economic and political reform 22 Those within the Soviet political elite 
likely to have questioned openly "new political thinking" have, for the most
11
part been retired or, as in the case of Ligachev, moved into less sensitive 
positions The major area o-f opposition to Gorbachev's proposals appears in 
the military area First o-f all, implementation o-f his domestic investment 
policies will have adverse budgetary implications -for the military Moreover, 
the ongoing discussion o-f reasonable su-f f i c i ency" in the security realm, with 
proposals -for possible unilateral reductions and asymmetrical reductions in the 
conventional area demonstrates quite different perspectives, especially between 
civilian and military analysts 23
What is evident from recent personnel changes is the fact that Gorbachev 
is staffing key positions within the state and party foreign policy apparatus 
with individuals who support his views and who, in some cases, advocated them 
before they were incorporated in Gorbachev's own thinking Although this by no 
means assures that policies based on the concepts of "global problems and 
interdependence" will be implemented in Soviet policy, it does mean that 
Gorbachev will find advice and support if he attempts to introduce such 
poi ici es
The concept of national security has undergone modification, as well, in 
the recent pronouncments of the Party leadership Soviet security, as 
conceived of by Gorbachev, depends increasingly on political and economic, as 
well as on military factors, and cannot be guaranteed unilaterally by a mere 
increase in Soviet military capabilities 24 Recent shifts in the Soviet 
position on arms control negotiations —  especially concerning intrusive 
on-site verification —  and the creation of sections responsible for arms 
control within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Department 
seem to indicate a new commitment to negotiation that coincides with this 
broadened view of security It is possible that, in line with his plans for 
revitalizing the economy, Gorbachev will begin to transfer resources from the 
military to the civilian sector To date the only evidence to support such an 
assertion is circumstantial and based on remarks made by Gorbachev that
12
indicate that he is not about to increase military spending, so that he can 
accomplish political and economic gains which, over the long run, would enhance 
Soviet security 25 Most important is the need to rebuild and modernize the 
economic base of the Soviet Union
Although none of these developments yet provides conclusive evidence that 
the Soviets are about to restructure their foreign and security policies, they 
indicate an understanding of the failures of past policy and the need for 
change, if the USSR is to establish a more effective policy in the future 
During the past three-and-a-half years a growing body of evidence suggests that 
actual Soviet behavior has been undergoing change as well —  and change of a 
sort consistent with the new political thinking In virtually all areas of 
their relations with the outside world the Soviets have attempted to revitalize 
their role, and that 'revitalization has not merely been based on pursuing the 
standard policies of the late Brezhnev era
The importance of Gorbachev's new thinking about Soviet foreign and 
security policy results partially from the recognition that the U S position 
in the world is not based exclusively on military capabilities, as important as 
they are for the U S role as a superpower If the Soviet Union is to become a 
full-fledged global power, it must be able to compete with the United States 
economically and diplomatically, as well as in the military sphere However, 
only by very basic, long-term changes can it keep up in the scientific and 
technological race and thereby retain the hope of becoming an economic 
superpower Thus, the major efforts to restructure the Soviet domestic 
economic (and political) system are meant, in part, to strengthen the economic 
base from which the USSR can operate in the future The strategy of 
interdependence is meant to move the Soviet economy toward joining the world 
market for the dual purposes of gaining greater benefits for the USSR itself 
and of expanding Soviet influence in international economic affairs 26 
Moreover, unless the Soviets are able to keep pace with technological
13
developments in the West, the military capabilities of the USSR will likely 
fall behind those of the United States by the end of the century
The success of Gorbachev s efforts to restructure the Soviet economy and 
to close the existing <and growing) technological gap requires a relaxation in 
the arms race and a reduction in policies likely to result in confrontation and 
tension with the West 27
New Political Thinking" and Recent Soviet International Behavior
One of the most visible characteristics of Soviet international behavior 
since Gorbachev assumed the leadership of the CPSU has, in fact, been its 
renewed activism In virtually all areas of importance to the Soviet Union —  
from relations with the United States and China to developments in the Middle 
East —  the new Soviet leadership has demonstrated, in the words of Dimitri 
Simes, “a new sense of purpose, a new realism and a new creativity "28 
Gorbacheva's primary objective has been to reverse the decline in both the 
effectiveness and the credibility of Soviet policy that had set in during the 
final years of the Brezhnev leadership and to regain the initiative in 
international affairs
Of primary concern has been the state of Soviet-U S relations which had 
deteriorated dramatically since the mid-1970s More important, however, than 
the mere fact of the increased hostility in relations with the United States 
was the renewed vigor with which the United States was pursuing its 
international interests In the military realm the Reagan Administration had 
initiated a major program aimed at modernizing and expanding U S military 
capabilities In the Third World it had, in effect, virtually declared war on 
a number of Soviet clients and made clear that the Soviets would not be 
permitted to make additional gains comparable to those of the mid-1970s In 
other words, despite strategic parity in the military area, the Soviets were 
not accepted by the United States as an equal in the international political 
system Moreover, the revitalized U S arms buildup, symbolized most
14
dramatically in the Strategic Defense Initiative, threatened to vitiate past 
Soviet efforts to gain strategic parity with the United States
Under Gorbachev the Soviets have made dramatic overtures in the attempt to 
facilitate nuclear arms control negotiations with the United States 
including their willingness to discuss the European theater separately from 
overall strategic issues that has resulted in the INF agreement, their 
proposals to cut strategic weapons by fifty percent and to place a complete 
moratorium on testing, their agreement to on-site inspection as part of the 
verification process for the INF agreement and indications of a willingness to 
submit to further on-site verification should additional agreements be reached, 
and an offer to negotiate major reductions —  even non-symmetrical ones in 
conventional weapons and manpower in Central Europe 29 Although one of the 
Soviet objectives is no doubt to project the image of having a stronger 
corniti tment to arms control than that of the United States for propaganda 
purposes, a broader purpose appears to be based on the realization that a 
renewed arms race with the United States would undermine the attempts to commit 
resources to the revitalization of the domestic economy Moreover, and 
probably of greatest importance, are in the words of Seweryn Bialer and Joan 
Afferica, Soviet security concerns These include the widening American 
technological preponderance, the accelerating American offensive nuclear arms 
program, and the tension and danger inherent in a new arms race Even more 
important than fear of the known is fear of the unknown, the terrible 
uncertainties concealed in America s grandiose Strategic Defense 
Initiative "30
In their relations with the major European allies of the United States the 
Soviets appear to be movivated strongly by the desire to convince these 
countries of their good intentions and to get them to put pressure on the 
United States to negotiate with the USSR, as well as by the desire to normalize 
relations with the key West Euyropean states 31 j^e case that they have been
15
trying to make also includes the argument that, despite continuing problems in 
U S -Soviet relations, the mutual benefits derived from the detente of the 
1970s can and should continue and be built upon
Another example of recent shifts in Soviet policy can be seen in effort to 
expand trade relations and to play a more active role in the international 
economic system With this objective in mind the Soviets have applied for 
observer status at the GATT, shown a willingness to deal more fully with the 
European Economic Community, and reorganized signficantly their foreign trade 
institutions and initiated efforts to attract Western investment capital in 
joint enterprises 32 As aiready noted, essential to the success of the 
economic reform program is a closing of the technological gap which requires a 
more intensive interaction with the world economy than has existed in the 
past
When we turn to an examination of recent Soviet policy in the Third World, 
the evidence indicates, as well, revitalized efforts, including a number 
innovative initiatives, to reestablish or consolidate their role as a major 
world actor 33 Since Gorbachev took over as head of the CPSU in early 1985 the 
Soviets have attempted to reestablish their position in the Middle East ~  the
I
Third World region of primary importance for their long-term security 
interests For example, in line with prior policy, they have made new 
commitments of military aid to both Syria and Libya34 and have continued to 
support Iraq in its war against Iran, while simultaneously working to normalize 
relations with the latter However, they have also expanded their efforts to 
reach out to more moderate Arab states —  such as Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait 
and even to open up discussions with Israel Since 1986, for example, they 
have mediated a reconciliation of competing factions of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, initiated talks with Egypt concerning a possible 
Middle East peace conference, responded to Kuwaiti requests for protection of 
their oil tankers against Iran by leasing three Spoviet tankers that now carry
16
Kuwaiti oil, held various informal discussions with Israel, and signed economic 
agreements with Iran 35
In Afghanistan after attempts to pacify the country by conquest and to 
exert greater pressure on Pakistan to accept the new "status quo' in the 
region, by early 1988 the Soviets signed a formal agreement to cut their losses 
and withdraw their troops from Afghanistan By fall 1988 the withdrawal was on 
schedule, although the Soviets announced a temporary halt because of the 
upsurge in attacks on both Afghan gove nment and Soviet installations 3Ó The 
motivation for the withdrawal results from the Soviet recognition of the low 
likelihood of successfully implementing their objectives in Afghanistan and 
from their desire to reduce the mi 1itary/economic and political costs to the 
Soviet Union in relations with the United States and with China
Relations with India, the single most important non-communist developing 
country for the USSR, have been reinvigorated by mutual visits of Rajiv Gandhi 
and Mikhail Gorbachev and by new Soviet credits for military and civilian 
purchases The Soviets are well aware of the fact that, unless they can 
continue to remain relevant for the primary Indian concerns security 
against Pakistan <and China) and economic development —  relations are likely 
to stagnate 37
In Africa, although the Soviets initially expanded support for their 
embattled clients in Angola and Ethiopia, more recently they have backed 
efforts to reach a negotiated settlement of the civil war in Angola that would 
result in the pull-out of Cuban troops 38 Finally, Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze s official visits to Latin America in early fall 1987 gave 
evidence of the Soviets desire to expand diplomatic relations with major Latin 
American countries Economic concerns and a wide range of other international 
issues were on the agenda during the discussions with leaders in Brazil, 
Argentina, and Uruguay Most important, however, was Shavardnadze's effort to 
project the image of a Soviet Union concerned about the problems of the region
17
and willing to assist in resolving them 39
Thus, Soviet policy in the Third World has been undergoing some change, 
with the most dramatic developments occurring in Afghanistan What is most 
evident is a greater degree of flexibility in Soviet inititatives, as in the 
Middle East, but not an abandonment of past commitments There is an enhanced 
interest in the larger and regionally more significant states, even though they 
are capitalist Moreover, the Soviets appear to be attempting to reduce 
involvement in regional conflicts that they view as hopeless and to decrease 
the overall financial costs of their foreign policy
In East Asia the Gorbachev leadership has engaged in a wide range of 
activities aimed at increasing the political and economic role of the USSR in 
an area where, despite greatly enhanced military capabilities, the Soviet Union 
remains largely a marginal actor Gorbachev's speech on Asian affairs made in 
Vladivostok in late July 1986 was the most comprehensive statement concerning 
Asia ever presented by a Soviet leader and set the tone for a new Soviet 
approach to relations with the region In fact, more than a year earlier he 
had broached some of the issues when he referred to the possibility of an 
all-Asian forum which would bring together all Asian countries, including 
China, in order to improve relations and deal with issues of common concern 40 
The purpose of Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech was to emphasize the fact that 
the USSR is indeed an Asian power and to apply specifically to the 
Asian-Pacific region the elements of new thinking in Soviet policy At least 
half of the General Secretary's remarks were devoted to domestic economic 
concerns and bluntly describe the gravity of the problems in Soviet Asia and 
the need for dramatic reform The remainder discussed foreign policy 
considerations, with special attention to the objective of normalization of 
relations with China, as well as with other countries in the region, and the 
possibilities for economic cooperation
The gist of Gorbachev s remarks provide some recognition of the fact that
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past Soviet policy in East Asia, which has relied heavily on the expansion of 
its military capabilities, has failed in its efforts to accomplish most Soviet 
objectives Despite the almost exponential growth in military capabilities, 
the Soviets have not been able to turn those capabilities into political 
gains
When Gorbachev assumed the leadership of the Soviet state, the Soviet 
Union had emerged as the dominant military power in East Asia However, its 
political ties and economic relations were extremely limited The growth of 
military power had, in effect, exacerbated the tensions that underlie Soviet 
relations with most of the other countries of the region, as Vladimir Ivanov, 
the head of the Pacfic Department of the Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations, has admitted 41
The major focus of Gorbachev's efforts to revitalize Soviet policy in Asia 
has occurred in policy toward China, and for good reason The 
military-oriented, hard-line policies of the past had proven to be 
counterproductive In fact, they had gone far toward driving China into a de 
facto alliance with the United States, Japan and Western Europe The Soviet 
leadership has introduced major initiatives in an attempt to normalize 
relations with China —  initiatives that promise to reduce Soviet military 
pressure on China and assist China in its economic modernization program 
Bilateral trade turnover has expanded significantly in the past few years to 
reach more than 1 8 billion rubles in 1986, compared with less than 500 million 
three years earlier 42 The polemics that earlier dominated Sino-Soviet 
relations have been toned down dramatically The Soviets no longer denounce 
the domestic reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping, and the Chinese have largely 
stopped calling for a united front against hegemonism *43
Important, as well, has been progress on all of the "three obstacles to 
normalization of relations referred to by the Chinese —  the Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and the huge numbers of
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Soviet troops massed along the S,no-Sov,et border In 1988 the Soviets have 
committed themselves to the tuli withdrawal of thelr torces trom Afghanistan by 
February 1989 They have also indicated their willingness to negotiate a 
mutual draw-down of forces along the Smo-Soviet border, and have encouraged 
the Vietnamese in their decision to withdraw their troops from Cambodia by 
1990 Moreover, the INF agreement reached with the United States calls for the 
dismantling of Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Asia, as well as in 
Europe 44
Yet, even though the three obstacles have not yet been eliminated, 
relations between the Soviet Union and China have moved toward normalization in 
all but name Moreover, high-level talks are scheduled for early 1989, which 
may well result in the established of full markedly improved relations between 
the two countraies As Thomas Hart has argued, ‘the spectacular improvement 
already made in Smo-Soviet relations bears witness to another fact that simply 
cannot be ignored —  namely that considerable progress can be made despite the 
differences remaining on a wide range of fundamental questions 45 From 
Moscow's perspective, the primary objective is to reduce tensions in Asia by 
eliminating a prime cause for China's allying itself with the Ulest As we have 
seen, the reduction of tension as a prerequisite for successful economic 
restructuring is a core element of Gorbachev's program
The tone of Soviet relations with Japan has improved, as well, though 
there is little evidence that the Soviets are yet willing to consider the 
essential problem in bilateral relations, the territorial dispute concerning 
the Southern Kuriles occupied by the USSR since World War II Soviet policies 
of the Brezhnev years, which included the dramatic expansion of military 
capabilities in the Asian-Pacific region and the deployment of Soviet forces on 
the Kuriles, raised the level of Japanese concern about its military security 
The result was a substantial increase in Japanese military capabilities, a 
strengthening of the alliance with the United States, and the expansion of
20
economic and political ties with China4<6
In attempting to improve relations with Japan the Soviets -find themselves 
in a very difficult position Though access to Japanese capital and 
technological know-how are important -for the Soviet economy, there is little 
that the Soviets have to offer the Japanese short of returning the Kurile 
Islands As hiroshi Kimura has argued, "the Soviet Union needs Japan 
technologically, economically, and hence dimplomatical 1 y , but Japan can get 
along without the Soviet Union as long as its security is assured "47
In Southeast Asia the Soviets have mounted increasing efforts to expand 
both diplomatic and economic contacts with the members of ASEAN largely 
without success to date 48 yetf their close ties to Vietnam, which most ASEAN 
members see as a potential security threat to the region, and their basic 
irrelevance to the economies of the region make prospects for any dramatic 
breakthrough in rei ations most unlikely in the foreseeable future For 
example, total Soviet trade with ASEAN in 198Ó was valued at $487 million, 
compared with ASEAN trade with Japan of $29 billion and with the United States 
of $24 billion 49 Soviet support for Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia should 
buttress other efforts to extend relations with the ASEAN states 50
The Soviets have also been active in establishing relations with the new 
micro-states of the South Pacific that give them access to fishing rights and 
port facilities 51 These activities have raised concerns in the United States 
and Japan about the possible long-term pol111cal-mi 1itary objectives of the 
Soviet Union in the region One result has been the decision of Japan, at U S 
urging, to commit expanded economic assistance to these countries
While Soviet policy throughout the region in the recent past has 
emphasized the need to reduce tension and establish improved relations and 
cooperation, until quite recently its policy toward North Korea has followed an 
apparently quite different tact The transfer of substantial amounts of modern 
military equipment to Korea in the mid-1980s increased concerns about the
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possibility of a new outbrtak of fighting on the Korean Peninsula More 
recently, however, the Sov ets have praised North Korea's cautious approach to 
relations with the South ard have also expanded dealings with South Korea <in 
part, related to Soviet pai ticipation in the Seoul Olympics) 52
In September 1988 Gem ral Secretary Gorbachev made another key speech in 
Krasnoyarsk, a city in the Soviet Far East associated with a disputed Soviet 
radar facility 53 spo|< length of recent improvements in relations with
China, noted the inadequacy of relations with Japan and spoke of cautious 
optimism about relations with the ASEAN countries The major focus of the 
speech, however, was on improving the security climate of East Asia as a 
prelude to expanded economic relations Gorbachev made a number of proposals 
for the furtherance of secjrity in the region Several of these proposals, 
such as the mutual U S -Soviet dismantling of military bases in the Philippines 
and Vietnam, are clearly meant for propaganda purposes Others —  such as 
calls for a security conference to be held no later than 1990, for Soviet and 
U S commitments not to increase the number of nuclear weapons in the region, 
and for expanded communications to ensure naval and air security in the region 
—  may well attract interest in the region
Gorbachev s new policy in Asia, as his policies in Europe and elsewhere in 
the Third Uorld, is based on a recognition that the policies of the past have 
largely failed The expansion of Soviet military power in the region did not 
bring with it comparable political gains and, in fact, was an important element 
in pushing the Chinese toward Japan and the United States, in strengthening the 
security ties between Japan and the United States, and in preventing an 
meaningful expansion of relations with the countries of ASEAN The new 
approach, which combines efforts at an expanded economic relationship with 
indications of some movement in the military area <e g the commitment to 
withdraw SS-20s from Asia as well as Europe and the indication of a willingness 
to reduce military manpower along the Chinese border), coincides with the "new
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thinking in Moscow
Future Soviet Policy and U S Interests 
We return now to the questions posed earlier concerning the meaning and 
implications oí the debate on New Political Thinking for the future of Soviet 
foreign policy Does the debate portend a substantive shift in Soviet policy, 
or does it merely concern the tactics to be employed to pursue more effectively 
poiicies long in place?
In responding to this question it is important, first, to outline what in 
fact are the guidelines for Soviet policy that emerge from the discussions in 
Moscow The first essential point is Gorbachev s recognition that significant 
improvement in the Soviet economy is the indispensable basis for future Soviet 
power in the world He and his associates recognize that the positive 
assessment [from a Soviet perspective] of the "international correlation of 
forces that dominated Soviet thinking in the 1970s was premature, at best It 
overestimated the role of military power in the ability of the Soviet Union to 
accomplish its foreign policy objectives and greatly underestimated the ability 
of the United States effectively to renew its military, political, and economic 
challenge to the USSR What is required, if the Soviet Union is to become a 
full-fledged superpower in the twenty-first century, is a vital and vibrant 
Soviet society with an economic base from which to challenge continued U S 
predominance Thus, for the foreseeable future the Soviets will give priority 
to domestic economic reform and to the political and social “restructuring 
necessary to accomplish this goal
To accomplish these objectives, however, the Soviets require a period of 
respite from the global conflict and confrontation that have characterized much 
of the past decade An upsurge in international tension and an increase in 
military expenditures would exacerbate the difficulties of economic reform and 
dim the prospects for significant improvement in Soviet economic performance 
Thus, for the foreseeable future the Soviets will pursue policies aimed at
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reducing international crisis and improving rei ations un th the West, Japan and 
China -- in other words, a policy of retrenchment that will permit them to 
devote their resources and attention to domestic concerns
Yet this retrenchment will not result in renewed isolationism or in a 
withdrawal -from the international gains of the past Rather, competition with 
the United States and China will continue, as we have witnessed since 
Gorbachev's appointment as General Secretary, but with different emphases One 
of the major objectives of what can only be viewed as a re.nv.gorated Soviet 
diplomacy is to refurbish the image and credibility of the Soviet Union as a 
global power and, concomitantly, to undermine those of the United States 
Soviet initiatives in the arms control area have already tended to force the 
United States on the defensive, as have the broadened Soviet diplomatic 
initiatives in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region Essential to 
current Soviet policy, as well, is a ■normalization" of U S -Soviet relations 
which would bring with it numerous benefits for the Soviet leadership Most 
important would be the reduction of external pressure on the Soviet leaders at 
a time when they are concerned primarily with overcoming the long-neglected 
problems that challenge their domestic social and economic system In 
addition, although Gorbachev has made quite clear that he will not pursue 
foreign economic policies that would result in dependence on the West, he does 
expect that the Soviet economy will benefit from increased trade, investment in 
the form of joint ventures, and technical Know-how from the West In Asia 
continued improvements in relations with China and the expansion of economic 
ties with Japan would bring appreciable gains, as well
A policy of retrenchment does not mean either abandonment of gains already 
made in the Third World or of the use of force when threats arise to valued 
clients or national interests The Soviets will attempt to retain the gains of 
the past when the political costs are not exhorbitant and the probabilities of 
success are good, even if this involves new commitments of support Pressures
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on the West can also be maintained through indirect means, principally by 
taking advantage of conflicts between the industrial states and the developing 
world Expansion of political and diplomatic contacts with key non-communist 
developing states might bring far greater long-term benefits for the Soviets 
than their past emphasis on radical Marxist-Leninist regimes, such as those in 
Angola and South Yemen A restructured Soviet policy of this type implies the 
creation of alignment structures tilted against the United States and its key 
allies that would incorporate a growing range of developing countries, while 
direct military competition with Washington essentially marks time These 
alignments could build on the cleavages within the Western alliance and on the 
inherent anti-Americanism widespread in the developing world, including that in 
countries currently closely tied to the United States, and would aim at 
shifting the burden of "contain m g n the United States to Soviet clients and to 
states opposed to U S policies, even though they might be capitalist and 
firmly within the Western sphere of influence A Soviet Union which saw itself 
as an integral part of the existing international system —  rather than as the 
besieged center of a competing alternate system —  would likely be even more 
pragmatic in its search for allies and friends and in the policies that it 
pursued than the USSR has been to date Moreover, it would probably be more 
successful in establishing the type of global role that to date has eluded the 
Soviet leadership
The lines of future Soviet policy that emerge from the recent Soviet 
discussions of new thinking," as well as from Soviet behavior, appear to go 
beyond mere tactical modifications in past policy Agreement on a reduction of 
the Soviet nuclear arsenal, expanded efforts to establish contacts with 
non-Marxist regimes in the Third World that are not based primarily on security 
relations, including especially the economically dynamic countries of the 
Pacific Rim -- such moves are more than mere tactical modifications of past 
policy However, even if these changes are meant only as modifications of
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existing strategy, the/ can have longer term implications -for the evolution of 
Soviet policy Given that the motivation for the new thinking in Moscow is 
based on the desire to rebuild Soviet economic capabilities and to refurbish 
the USSR's international linage and claims to superpower status, this process is 
likely to be an extended one, as Gorbachev himself has admitted Yet, a 
long-term policy of the tyne outlined above may bring with it the seeds of more 
fundamental change in Sovi t domestic and foreign policy 54 Qne result might 
be over time the lessening of the overt military threat posed by the Soviet 
Union and the emergence of Soviet international behavior more in line with that 
of a traditional Great Pow<r
By no means does this imply that U S -Soviet competition or that between 
the USSR and China will ceise or that the Soviets will no longer challenge U S 
and Chinese interests In fact, a revitalized Soviet Union armed with economic 
and political capabilities to match its military strength would in many ways be 
a more formidable competitor than it has been to date It would be more 
capable of benefiting from the conflicts among Western states and those between 
the West and the developing world were it not viewed as a potential security 
threat by the leaders of so many countries and were it able to provide economic 
alternatives to the West
The Soviets would present a more variegated and more complex challenge 
one that continued, though on a reduced basis, to employ its military might to 
accomplish important goals, but also could count on stable alignments with 
non-Marxist governments Yet that challenge would be less fraught with the 
dangers of military confrontation between the two superpowers Moreover,
new thinking0 is likely to survive only if produces success in terms of the 
Soviet ability to accomplish its international objectives more effectively than 
have the policies of the past It will require that the domestic reform
programs currently being put in place succeed to the point that they enable the 
USSR to play a more effective international economic role Its continuation
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will also depend on the U S response to Soviet 
continue to pursue a policy based on maximizing
initiatives Were the U S 
mi 1 itary capabi1 11íes, "new
to
thinking would likely disappear quite rapidly 1
I
The requirements of the policy discussed here also imply profound 
dilemmas There is the longstanding issue of choosing between ideological
I
clients and bourgeois elements whose revolutinary credentials are intrinsically 
m w e d support tor the Utter may arrest or diteat promising vouements (as •"
South Africa) and undermine what has been achieled <e g in Nicaragua) The 
choice is more complex than simply choosing between interparty and 
state-to-state priorities The choice con-fronting the Soviets is whether to
remain isoloated within their own socialist system or to draw on the greater
¡
resources and stimulus o-f the nonsocialist world to spur internal
techno-economic growth The latter requires accomodating themselves to a world 
in which the Soviet model of socialism is less Attractive and also reconciling 
central Party control with the demands of a more competitive market
In the process of accomodation and adaptation the Soviet Union runs the 
risk of losing its revolutionary soul and the confidence of its allies in the 
developing world Worse, it may set adrift the European provinces of its 
empire, the anchor of its external power As Gorbachev's visit to Romania in 
summer 1987 revealed, Moscow may be in competition with its own clients for 
favor from the West For different reasons its own internal reforms may also 
incite greater destabilizing forces within the Eastern bloc A conservative 
counterreaction to reform in Eastern Europe and heightened worker 
dissatisfaction, arising from expectations of harder work with no immediate 
prospect for material gain or greater freedom, may produce a coalition of the 
Right and the Left in Eastern Europe, with adverse repercussions on the 
stability of the Gorbachev regime itself Though the logic of perestroika 
and new political thinking" is strong and, no doubt attractive, resistance to 
it remains strong as well
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